Value Masters Merchant Capital → Office of the Presidency. An authority request: manage the fund's non-bank assets actively and list them on foreign exchanges while the state keeps 80%.
The brief opens with the loss the privatisation model produced for the state rather than for its buyers. Its lead case is Tekel's spirits business: sold by the Privatisation Administration to a Turkish consortium for $292m in 2004, on to TPG for $810m in 2006, and to Diageo for $2.1bn in 2011 — a sevenfold move in equity value while the state held none of it. Against that it sets the programme total, roughly $69bn of proceeds between 1986 and 2023, and the accumulated public-private partnership guarantee payments on the newer bridges: Osmangazi, Yavuz Sultan Selim and 1915 Çanakkale, each running several hundred million dollars a year against traffic that came in far below guarantee.
It then sets out what the state already owns. The fund reports TRY 12.7 trillion of total assets and TRY 2 trillion of equity across 32 portfolio companies in seven sectors, with 188,631 employees: the three large state banks and Borsa İstanbul in financial services at 72.97% of assets, TPAO and BOTAŞ in energy, Turkish Airlines and PTT in transport, Türk Telekom and Turkcell in technology, Eti Maden in mining with roughly 73% of the world's boron.
The proposition is neither another privatisation nor waiting for foreign direct investment. It is active asset management followed by minority listings abroad — NYSE, Frankfurt, London, Hong Kong and Singapore — with the state retaining 80% or more. The benchmarks cited are Norway's GPFG for active management discipline, Temasek for taking state companies to global listings, Saudi Arabia's PIF and the Aramco offering for raising capital without losing control, and Korea's post-2001 asset management company partnering with international capital.
What is offered: a 20% cash contribution alongside the state, a shareholding strictly proportional to that cash, an international merchant network, operational improvement with IFRS and ESG discipline, and measurable three-year targets under Santiago Principles reporting. What is requested: a portfolio management mandate for non-bank assets, authorisation for minority listings abroad, a management fee of 5–8%, and approval of the three-year programme.
The PDF attached to this page is the English edition prepared for Oaktree and Brookfield: the same facts, read from the investor's side of the table — what Ankara books as loss is the buyer's return. An editable PowerPoint is also attached. Read alongside Section 01 of the note: this brief is the demand side of Lane B. Ankara is being asked to appoint an operator for the inventory it already holds; Oaktree is the operator that fits the mandate.